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Abstract—Recent attacks using thermal laser stimulation
(TLS) have shown that it is possible to extract cryptographic
keys from the battery-backed memory on state-of-the-art field-
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). However, the professional
failure analysis microscopes usually employed for these attacks
cost in the order of 500k to 1M dollars. In this work, we
evaluate the use of a cheaper commercial laser fault injection
station retrofitted with a suitable amplifier and light source
to enable TLS. We demonstrate that TLS attacks are possible
at a hardware cost of around 100k dollars. This constitutes a
reduction of the resources required by the attacker by a factor
of at least five. We showcase two actual attacks: data extraction
from the SRAM memory of a low-power microcontroller and
decryption key extraction from a 20 nm technology FPGA device.
The strengths and weaknesses of our low-cost approach are
then discussed in comparison to the conventional failure analysis
equipment approach. In general, this work demonstrates that
TLS backside attacks are available at a much lower cost than
previously expected.
Index Terms—IC Security, Optical Attacks, Thermal Laser
Stimulation, FPGA Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Data extraction from integrated circuits (ICs) can pose
a serious threat to the secrets stored within. Extraction of
cryptographic keys, sensitive data stored in memory, or de-
vice fingerprint information, as used in physically unclonable
functions (PUFs), allows attackers to break security features.
Physical attacks, such as side-channel attacks, are one of
the main approaches to extract data contained in embedded
devices.
Thermal laser stimulation (TLS) is one such technique,
which analyzes changes in the current consumption of the
device in response to applied laser radiation. In the past,
it has been used to read out the content of static random-
access memory (SRAM) and thus allows the characterization
of SRAM PUFs [1]. It was also applied to extract the key
from the battery-backed random-access memory (BBRAM)
contained within the decryption unit of a 20 nm technology
field-programmable gate array (FPGA) [2]. Furthermore, TLS
can be considered as a suitable technique for the readout of
microcontroller SRAM working memory [3]. Therefore, it is
a powerful data extraction tool for an attacker on hardware
level.
However, all previously mentioned experiments have been
conducted using professional failure analysis (FA) equipment,
more specifically a Hamamatsu Phemos-1000 laser scanning
microscope (LSM). Such a system typically costs around
500k to 1M dollars, and even when renting, costs for the
development of a TLS attack are still in the range of thousands
of dollars [2]. As a consequence, even though TLS is a pow-
erful attack technique, the connected costs might discourage
attackers from applying it.
Yet, it needs to be kept in mind that FA equipment usually
offers a lot more features than an attacker might actually
need, for instance, support for wafer handling and automated
testing equipment, very fast acquisition times, and integration
of other measurement techniques, such as photon emission. In
principle, however, all that is needed for a TLS attack is a
way to move a laser spot over the device and simultaneously
measure a current. This raises the question, if attackers might
be able to use simpler, more low-cost setups. If so, the threat
posed by TLS techniques would be larger than expected so
far. The main aim of this work is to determine if this is the
case.
To evaluate this question, suitable alternatives to the usually
employed FA systems need to be considered. One such candi-
date are commercially available setups used for evaluation of
laser fault injection (LFI) which are by a factor of around five
to ten cheaper than FA LSMs. Such systems usually feature
a laser with focusing optics and some mechanical means to
move the laser spot on the device under test (DUT), e.g., via
motorized stages. The only thing required to perform TLS with
such a system would thus be a current preamplifier and a laser
of suitable wavelength. Hence, it seems plausible that such a
setup could be modified to perform TLS attacks at a low cost.
However, it is unclear if the expected slower scanning speeds
of motorized stages, as opposed to galvanometric mirrors
usually used in FA solutions, might make attacks infeasible.
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Fig. 1. Scanning the laser over the DUT causes a change in current
consumption due to thermal stimulation. Figure based on [4].
Besides that, a drift in electronics and the mechanical system
as well as a lower scan resolution might hinder an attack.
An evaluation of the general possibility of developing such
a setup thus seems to be beneficial. Consequently, this paper
will evaluate if such a setup is generally feasible and what
advantages and disadvantages it would bring for a potential
attacker. This knowledge could then be used in the future to
develop a more accurate TLS attacker model and thus better
protected devices.
Our Contribution. In this work, we demonstrate the feasi-
bility of a low-cost TLS attack setup by retrofitting a commer-
cial LFI setup with a suitable laser, amplifier, and software.
For this, we only use commercially available components.
We then evaluate two previously published attack types on
the setup. The first one is the extraction of data from the
SRAM of a microcontroller, as used for PUF characterization
[1] and working memory data extraction [3]. For this attack,
we showcase TLS scans of the whole memory area and also
demonstrate that data can be extracted from the individual
memory cells. The second evaluated attack is the readout of the
decryption key from the BBRAM of an FPGA, as presented in
[2]. We demonstrate that even with a low-cost setup, extraction
of the full 256-bit AES key from the device is possible. Finally,
we discuss and compare our results to the classical approach
of using professional failure analysis equipment and highlight
possible countermeasures.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Thermal Laser Stimulation (TLS)
Techniques from failure analysis (FA) that use laser radi-
ation to impact the device under test (DUT) are referred to
as laser stimulation techniques. Usually, the laser is scanned
over the DUT while device parameters like the current con-
sumption are monitored, grayscale-encoded and plotted over
the scanning position, see Fig. 1. The resulting response map
shows areas where laser radiation causes changes in the current
consumption of the DUT. For thermal laser stimulation (TLS),
the laser wavelength is chosen to have a photon energy smaller
than the silicon bandgap, which consequently only causes local
heating and no photocarrier generation.
When drain or source of a single metal-oxide semiconductor
field-effect transistor (MOSFET) are thermally stimulated,
effectively a voltage source between the corresponding metal
contact and the channel is generated [1], [5]. This voltage
source is also referred to as Seebeck generator, since it is
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Fig. 2. Memory cell under thermal stimulation. Figure based on [1].
caused by the Seebeck effect [6]. When the channel of the
transistor is low-ohmic, this generator is connected between
drain and source. In contrast, when the channel is high-
ohmic, one connection of the generator is floating and the
generated voltage is ineffective. The sign of the generated
voltage depends on whether drain or source are stimulated
and on the type of the MOSFET (n- or p-type) [6].
A memory cell, as implemented in complementary metal-
oxide semiconductor (CMOS) technology, basically consists
of two cross-coupled inverters, see Fig. 2. As can be seen,
the circuit stays in one of two states because of the cross-
coupling. While being in a stable state, for ideal transistors
there is no current flow between VCC and GND, since one of
the transistors in each connection from VCC to GND is high-
ohmic. However, under stimulation, the Seebeck generator
causes the creation of a voltage (USeebeck), which is added
to the existing voltage levels. When assuming 0 V as GND
level and, for instance, the drain of transistor N1 is stimulated,
effectively USeebeck is applied to the gate of N2. Consequently,
the resistance of N2 decreases via exponential sub-threshold
operation, which in turn results in an increased current flow
between VCC and GND. The same applies for transistor P1
when the drain of P2 is stimulated. The change in current
consumption can be expected to be in the nanoampere range
[1]. If a laser with a beam diameter approximately equal to
the transistor size is scanned over the cell, a TLS response
map as shown in Fig. 2 can be expected. Due to the increased
current consumption, the sensitive transistors will be shown as
brighter pixels. If the memory cell is in the inverted state, the
other two transistors are sensitive. The cell’s state can thus be
deduced from the TLS response map.
Note that due to the chosen laser wavelength only thermal
stimulation occurs, which can increase the leakage current of
the memory cell but cannot change its state.
B. TLS for PUF Characterization and Data Extraction
The extraction of data stored in SRAM on microcontrollers
can pose a threat to secrets stored within. For instance, the
authors of [1] show that the extraction of data from SRAM
memory on microcontrollers down to the 180 nm technology
node is possible. More specifically, they demonstrate the char-
acterization of a proof-of-concept SRAM-based PUF imple-
mentation on a microcontroller using TLS on professional FA
equipment. Similarly, the authors of [3] show the potential to
read out the whole working memory on a 180 nm technology
microcontroller using TLS. It should be noted that for both
attacks it was necessary to put the DUTs into a low-power
mode, to reduce the noise of the system.
Such attacks on SRAM memory of microcontrollers are
hereafter referred to as SRAM data extraction attacks.
C. TLS for Decryption Key Extraction
The authors of [2] demonstrate that the battery-backed
random access memory (BBRAM) on a 20 nm technology
field-programmable gate array (FPGA) can be read out with
TLS using professional FA equipment. The BBRAM stores a
256-bit key used for bitstream decryption. To retain the key
while the FPGA is powered off, the BBRAM is powered by a
coin-cell battery. During the attack, the TLS signal is acquired
by measuring the current consumption on this battery line.
Since the BBRAM is the only circuit powered by the battery,
the noise on this battery line is very low. It should be noted
that the attack was successful because the memory cell size is
approximately 2.8 × 3.1 µm, which is about 10 times larger
than expected minimum size on a 20 nm technology device
[2]. This can be explained by reliability, leakage, and low
current consumption considerations.
For their attack approach, the authors assume that the
BBRAM is located close to the configuration logic. They
consult the documentation to get an estimate of its location
on the chip. By conducting a TLS scan over the candidate
area, they can find the BBRAM. Afterward, they prove a data
dependency in the measurements and create a mapping from
memory cell locations to logical bits. Finally, they show that
a key stored in the BBRAM can be extracted using TLS in a
manual or automated fashion within minutes.
Although the BBRAM is typically only battery-backed
SRAM, this attack type is hereafter referred to as BBRAM
key readout attack.
III. SETUP
A. Laser Stimulation Setup
As core of our setup we use an ALPhANOV Single Laser
Microscope Station (S-LMS), which was designed for laser
fault injection purposes [7]. It is a microscope-based setup
that allows the injection of different laser sources. In our case
we use a 1424 nm laser diode capable of delivering more
than 300 mW in continuous waveform (CW) mode. The laser
power can be controlled via PC software. The laser is focused
through objectives, which are mounted on a manual turret, into
the IC backside. For thermal stimulation we use a 50x/0.65NA
objective with silicon thickness correction, for optical images
we additionally use 20x/0.5NA and 2.5x/0.1NA objectives.
The whole microscope is mounted on XYZ motorized stages,
which allow movements with a resolution of 50 nm. The
stages are controlled via PC software or a joystick. The S-LMS
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Fig. 3. Block diagram of the setup. Components marked with * are part of
the S-LMS [7].
is also equipped with infrared (IR) lighting and a short-wave
infrared (SWIR) camera. This allows the user to monitor the
laser spot position and perform optical navigation.
For measuring the current consumption during stimulation,
we use a Stanford Research Systems SR570 current preampli-
fier, which has a bias voltage feature. The preamplifier outputs
a voltage proportional to the current which is digitized using
a National Instruments ”PCI-6259” card.
To realize the scanning functionality and TLS response map
creation, we developed a scanning software in the “LabView”
programming environment from National Instruments. In this
software, the scanning parameters, such as step size, step
resolution, scanning speed and number of samples per pixel
can be entered. The stage, and thus also the laser spot, is
then moved continuously over the DUT while the preamplifier
output is sampled. From this data, a TLS response map is
created, in which higher current consumption of the DUT
corresponds to brighter pixels. The whole setup is visualized
in Fig. 3. Note that all results shown in this work have been
achieved with this setup.
B. Devices Under Test (DUTs)
1) DUT for SRAM Data Extraction: As mentioned in
Sect. II-B, reading out SRAM via TLS has been demonstrated
down to the 180 nm technology node. Thus, a 180 nm
Texas Instruments MSP430F5131 microcontroller is used in
our experiments. It is equipped with 1 KB of SRAM with a
cell size of approximately 2.5× 1.9 µm [3]. For access to the
silicon, the backside packaging material and the metal chip
carrier were removed.
During the experiments, VCC of the DUT is supplied with
2.6 V via an auxiliary power supply. The core, which contains
the SRAM, is supplied via the internally generated VCORE
voltage, which is also available externally at a pin. To this pin
we connect the SR570 current preamplifier and set the bias
voltage to 2.1 V, which is slightly above the VCORE voltage
of 1.9 V. In this way, a significant amount of the core voltage
is supplied by the SR570.
A JTAG debugging interface is connected to the device.
This allows to directly write arbitrary data into the SRAM.
For noise reduction on the VCORE net, the DUT is send to
low-power mode 4 (LPM4) during the TLS scan.
For all experiments on the MSP430, the current amplifica-
tion of the SR570 was set to 1 nAV−1 and the input offset
to 500 nA. The laser current was set to 600 mA, which
corresponds to a total power of about 43 mW for the 50x
lens. The silicon thickness correction of the objective was set
to 350 µm.
2) DUT for BBRAM Key Readout: The target platform
for bitstream key extraction is a Xilinx Ultrascale FPGA
development board from AVNET (model AES-KU040-DB-
G). It contains a Xilinx Ultrascale XCKU040-1FBVA676
FPGA manufactured with 20 nm technology in a flip-chip
ball grid array (BGA) package. Due to the flip-chip package,
direct access to the silicon is available and no preparation is
necessary. The thickness of the substrate is about 750 µm [2].
The 256-bit key used for bitstream decryption can be stored
in a battery-backed RAM (BBRAM) which is programmed
via a JTAG interface [8]. While the device is powered off,
the BBRAM is supplied by a battery via the VBATT line. To
measure the current consumption of the BBRAM during TLS,
we soldered cables to the battery connector and connected
them to the input of the SR570 current amplifier. During key
programming, the board is powered via its external supply.
During TLS experiments, however, the board is powered off
and the VBATT voltage is supplied via the bias voltage feature
of the SR570.
For all experiments on the Ultrascale FPGA, the current
amplification of the SR570 was set to 2 nAV−1 with no input
offset. The laser current was set to 500 mA, which corresponds
for the 50x lens to a total power of about 26 mW. The silicon
thickness correction of the objective was set to 750 µm.
IV. MEASUREMENT RESULTS
A. SRAM Data Extraction
1) SRAM Overview: To localize the SRAM optically, the
camera of the setup was used, see Fig. 4. After zeroizing
the whole SRAM via JTAG, the device is sent to low-power
mode by code run from flash. A TLS scan with 0.5 µm
scan step size was then acquired, see Fig. 5. It can be seen
that most of the memory shows a regular structure, except
for some irregular vertical strips, mainly in the bottom left
quadrant. Closer investigation revealed that this is data placed
in SRAM by the code which enters the low-power mode. This
already demonstrates that data dependencies can be observed.
The SRAM seems to be sub-divided into four blocks with a
small offset of about one cell width in between, as already
discovered in [3]. In addition, some cells seem to be more
sensitive to TLS, as can be seen by some irregular bright spots.
This can be explained by manufacturing variability. The TLS
response becomes increasingly blurry in the right half of the
scan, which can be explained by thermal and mechanical drift
of the DUT due to the long scan duration of 43 min. This
could be avoided by scanning smaller areas and refocusing
for each measurement.
Fig. 4. Optical image (20x lens) of the SRAM block.
50 µm
Fig. 5. TLS overview scan of the SRAM. The scan direction is bottom-to-top
(fast axis) and then left-to-right (slow axis).
2) Extraction of Single Bits: To demonstrate the extraction
of single bits, we compare measurements of a small area of the
SRAM, see Fig. 6. For the first measurement, the centered bit
(framed in red) is set to 1, while all other bits are 0. For the
second measurement, all bits, including the highlighted one
in the center, are 0. A pattern similar to the response map in
Fig. 2 can be observed. For bit value 1, bottom left and top
right of the cell are the most sensitive spots. In contrast, for
bit value 0, the sensitive spots are in the other corners of the
cell. The subtraction of both response maps reveals the change
more clearly.
These results show that the resolution of our setup is
sufficient for extracting data from arbitrary SRAM cells on the
MSP430 device. Consequently, an SRAM PUF implemented
with a similar feature size could be characterized with this
setup. If the memory layout would be reverse-engineered using
TLS, the full working memory of the MSP430 could be read
out as well.
B. BBRAM Key Readout
1) Localization and Optical Overview: In the attack sce-
nario of [2], the BBRAM has first to be localized inside the
configuration area. For this, we performed a scan of that area
with a pixel size of 5 µm and a stage speed of 2 mms−1
in about 5 min. The response map, see Fig. 7a, reveals
two sensitive areas when the BBRAM is activated. If the
BBRAM is deactivated, only one sensitive area remains, see
Fig. 7b. Fig. 8 shows an optical image of the area where TLS
– =
Bit = 1 Bit = 0 Difference
Fig. 6. Data dependency of the measurements for a single SRAM bit which
was first set to 1 and then to 0, while all other bits in the area are set to 0.
The subtraction of both response maps reveals the change more clearly.
1 mm
(a) BBRAM activated. (b) BBRAM deactivated.
Fig. 7. Localization scan with activated and deactivated BBRAM. The TLS
signal is superimposed on an optical image (2.5x lens).
sensitivity occurred. The two highlighted block-like structures
on the left correspond to the area where the TLS signal was
dependent on BBRAM activation. These are the BBRAM
block candidates, which are already known from [2]. The
structure on the right-hand side was always sensitive and thus
can be disregarded. The results show that the BBRAM can be
localized using our setup. In the next step, the detailed TLS
response map has to be analyzed.
2) TLS Overview Scan: To observe data dependencies in
the TLS response of the BBRAM, we first programmed a
random key and an all-zeroes key and acquired TLS response
maps, see Fig. 9a and 9b. It can be seen that different keys
lead to different patterns in the response map.
To further investigate the key dependency of the TLS
response, a single memory cell can be examined.
50 µm
Fig. 8. Optical image (20x lens) of the area sensitive to TLS with BBRAM
candidate framed red.
(a) Random key (b) All-zeroes key
Fig. 9. TLS response maps of the whole BBRAM programmed with two
different keys.
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Fig. 10. Data dependency of the measurements for a single BBRAM bit
which was first set to 1 and then to 0, while all other bits in the area were 0.
The subtraction of both response maps highlights the change more clearly.
3) Extraction of a Single Bit: To identify a single bit in the
TLS response map, we scanned a small area of the BBRAM
with high resolution (pixel size 50 nm, stage speed 50 µms−1)
with different bit values for one memory cell, see Fig. 10.
While the sensitive spots for bit value 1 are on the top left
and bottom right, the spots for value 0 are on the top right
and bottom left of the cell, cf. Fig. 2. The subtraction of
the two response maps clearly shows that the state and thus
the bit value of the centered BBRAM cell differs in the two
measurements. Hence, this experiment proves that the optical
resolution of our setup is sufficient for extracting the bit value
stored in one BBRAM cell. The observed cell size is about
3.2× 2.8 µm.
4) Key Extraction: Since we have already shown that data
extraction of single bits from the BBRAM is possible with our
setup and the mapping from physical to logical bit positions
is known from [2], now a complete key can be extracted.
For this, we subtract the response map of the all-zeroes key
(Fig. 9b) from the response map of the random key (Fig. 9a).
On the difference image, see Fig. 11, areas with large black
and white spots correspond to bit value 1, the others to value
0. By adding a grid to optically show the SRAM cell size and
position, the key bits can be easily extracted manually. Note
that the top row is used to store security-relevant information,
such as a configuration counter and error-detection bits [2].
The scan of the whole BBRAM for a pixel size of 250 nm
and a stage speed of 50 µms−1 takes about 7 min.
Given the above, the bitstream decryption key can be
extracted from the BBRAM using our setup within minutes.
This proves that the complete attack on the FPGA bitstream
decryption key can be conducted with a much cheaper setup
than previously expected.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Low-Cost vs. FA Setup
1) Acquisition Time: The experiments have shown that
the time needed for acquisition is substantially longer when
using the low-cost setup. This is due to the fact that for an
FA laser scanning microscope (LSM) only small and light
galvanometric mirrors are moved to scan the beam. In our
case, though, the optical setup is moved on mechanical stages
and the connected inertia poses a limit on the maximum scan
speed. To give some exemplary numbers, for an FA LSM an
acquisition time of 1.2 minutes can be expected for BBRAM
key extraction [2]. With our setup, 7 minutes were needed.
K255 K224
K31 K0
Fig. 11. Subtraction of the TLS response maps of the random key and the all-
zeroes key. The existence of black and white patterns in one cell corresponds
to bit value 1. Bit position K255 corresponds to the most significant bit of
the key. The key programmed into the BBRAM is: 0xf20c28551d626c-
97c75932351b5dcebf4de340562ca7f54ae34f42c2d9ae4b7e.
This is an increase by a factor of 5.8, but makes measurements
due to the generally short duration still unproblematic. For
TLS SRAM data extraction, experiments performed by the
authors have resulted in 4.8 minutes of acquisition time on an
FA LSM. Using the low-cost setup, a complete SRAM scan on
the MSP430 takes 43 minutes. This is an increase by a factor
of 9. For such a long acquisition time, negative effects such
as sample drift will lead to complications. This could already
be observed in Fig. 5 (Sect. IV-A). It can thus be seen that
with the approach demonstrated in this paper, attackers will
have to trade cost for time. Additionally, procedures such as
refocusing might be needed to prevent negative side effects,
although these are relatively easy to implement.
For a low-cost approach, mechanical stages seem to be the
obvious choice, since they are available in virtually any labora-
tory and microscope setup, as also in the used fault injection
setup. However, it should be noted that galvanometric scan
mirrors can be acquired at comparable prices to mechanical
stages. Yet, the optical setup is more demanding, especially
the requirements on the objective rise, since the field of view
has to be sufficiently large.
2) Resolution: In terms of optical resolution, FA LSMs and
the low-cost approach are virtually identical. This is due to
the fact that the optical resolution is mainly determined by
the wavelength and the numerical aperture of the objective
lens. Using the same lens and wavelength should thus yield
the same resolution in both setups. For the 50x lens and laser
used in our setup, an optical resolution of about 1 µm can be
expected.
For scan step resolution, the situation is different. The
angular stepping resolution of an LSM’s scanning mirror
is translated by the objective lens into a spatial scanning
resolution. This means that the scanning resolution can be
increased by using larger magnification lenses. In contrast,
the scan step resolution for the low-cost setup is simply the
resolution of the stage, 50 nm in our case. Both the LSM’s
and the low-cost setup’s scan resolution are significantly lower
than the optical resolution and can be expected to not be a
limiting factor.
In general it can be said that our setup is not better or
worse compared to an LSM in terms of resolution. However,
it should be noted that FA LSMs can be equipped with a solid
immersion lens (SIL), which can increase the resolution by a
factor of around 4.3 in case of the Hamamatsu Phemos system
[9].
3) Cost: Our setup only consists of commercially available
components. The core of the setup is a “S-LMS” station by
ALPhANOV. In a configuration suitable for retrofitting TLS,
the system costs about 102k USD, including a 1.4 µm laser.
Additionally, the SR570 current preamplifier for 2,595 USD
[10] and the NI-6259 digitizer card for 1,940 USD [11] have
to be acquired. Including the control PC and a LabView
license, the price of the complete setup is expected to be below
110k USD.
Compared to a Phemos-1000 Failure analysis setup with a
price between 500k and 1M USD, our setup is five to ten times
cheaper. Furthermore, the setup can in principle be set up on
a single desk and purchasing of the equipment is expected to
require less effort.
B. Attack Feasibility and Limitations
The feasibility of TLS attacks on SRAM in general depends
on the spatial distance between the sensitive transistors. Conse-
quently, the limiting factor is the laser spot size. The minimum
possible spot diameter is about 1 µm without SIL and 235 nm
with a recent SIL, which corresponds to cell dimensions of
2 µm and 470 nm, respectively. Thus, the attack is expected
to work at least down to these cell sizes. Furthermore, it can
be expected that with post processing of the TLS signal, for
instance, by deconvolution, an additional resolution enhance-
ment by a factor of two is possible. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the actual SRAM cell size limit for TLS attacks
is unknown and should be subject of future research. It should
also be noted that with the switch to new technologies, like
FinFET, changes in the behavior of the stimulated cells might
occur.
Next to the cell size, the attack is also limited by the amount
of noise present in the TLS signal. Specifically, the leakage
current of the transistor affected from stimulation should be
higher than the fluctuations in the overall current consumption.
In our experiments, this was fulfilled by the low noise on the
battery line of the FPGA, and by sending the microcontroller
to low-power mode.
Readers interested in more details regarding the attack
feasibility are directed to [2].
C. Countermeasures
The possible countermeasures against TLS attacks from the
chip backside can be divided into two categories. On the one
hand, techniques could be applied to obstruct the access to the
chip or the measurement signal, and on the other hand, active
attack detection mechanisms could be employed.
An approach for the former class could be to reduce the
resolution of the laser beam by scrambling the incoming light
from the chip backside, and thus increasing the beam diameter
within the silicon. In [12] this approach is applied against
optical contactless probing. The authors introduce the usage
of nanopyramid structures, which scramble the reflected light.
However, adding the nanopyramids between chip backside and
the transistors is only possible for bonding-based SOI devices.
Furthermore, the countermeasure was not tested with respect
to thermal stimulation. Yet, it might be an interesting approach
for further research.
Another approach for the first category of countermeasures
could address the destruction of the data dependency in the
TLS signal. Since the attack relies on low noise in the current
consumption of the target device, noise injection can be used
for this purpose. In [13] a noise source has been successfully
designed and integrated to protect an encryption core from
power analysis attacks. This shows that on-chip noise-based
mitigation techniques can work. Against TLS attacks on
SRAM, a proof of concept countermeasure was presented in
[2]. By injecting noise on the battery line of a BBRAM key
storage, TLS data extraction can be made much harder or
possibly even unfeasible. The authors show that this can be
an effective mitigation technique, even with negligibly lower
battery life time.
A more thorough approach is the protection of the chip
backside by employing an opaque coating layer to obstruct
optical access completely. However, a solely passive layer
could be easily removed by polishing. As evaluated in [14], the
integrity of the coating layer can be assured by in-silicon light
emitters and sensors. This combines an obstruction approach
(first category) with an active detection countermeasure (sec-
ond category). Yet, due to the high power consumption of the
photo sensors, this protection scheme can not protect devices
with a very restricted power profile, such as the BBRAM key
storage.
To actively detect the temperature changes induced by
the laser radiation, temperature sensors could be useful [2].
However, it is questionable whether the very small temperature
changes with a power of less than 50 mW can be detected with
a small amount of false positives. Furthermore, the current
consumption of temperature sensitive circuits, such as ring
oscillators, is typically high [15]. Hence, for power constrained
devices like the BBRAM, this does not seem to be a feasible
solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have shown that constructing a low-
cost setup for TLS is indeed feasible. By retrofitting an LFI
setup with the necessary equipment, we have demonstrated a
solution for TLS five to ten times cheaper than traditional FA
equipment. Although with slower signal acquisition, we were
still able to show that two state-of-the-art attacks, specifically
against SRAM on a microcontroller and BBRAM on an
FPGA, are possible in reasonable time. Consequently, the
attacker model must be rethought and adapted to better reflect
the lower-than-expected hurdle for an attacker to apply TLS.
Therefore, better protection mechanisms against attacks from
the chip backside will have to be deployed.
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